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SURVEY SECTION
Attorney-Client. Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830 (R.I. 1997).
A negligence-based legal malpractice claim requires proof that the
attorney's services departed from the standard of care owed to his
client and the client's legal position was damaged as a result of the
attorney's behavior.
In Vallinoto v. DiSandro,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff, whose divorce attorney had allegedly com-
pelled her to engage in sexual contacts an estimated 200 times, 2
was required to produce evidence at trial that the defendant attor-
ney had departed from the duty of care owed to his client and the
plaintiffs legal position was damaged as a result of the attorney's
behavior.3 The plaintiffs failure to produce evidence that the de-
fendant's legal services departed from the requisite standard of
care and failure to demonstrate actual damages each required a
directed verdict for the defendant.4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In May of 1987, Maria Del Rosario Vallinoto (Vallinoto), the
plaintiff, retained Edmond A. DiSandro (DiSandro), the defendant,
to represent her in a divorce action brought by her husband.5 In
August of 1987, Vallinoto and Disandro became involved in an inti-
mate physical relationship.6 DiSandro claimed that the relation-
ship was consensual, while Vallinoto claimed that the encounters
were coerced by DiSandro's threats to withdraw from representa-
tion.7 DiSandro allegedly stated that if he withdrew from repre-
senting Vallinoto, then she would be unable to retain a new
attorney,8 and the likely outcomes would be loss of child custody
and deportation. 9 The relationship lasted approximately eighteen
months and included an estimated 200 intimate encounters.10
1. 688 A.2d 830 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id. at 833.
3. See id. at 834.
4. See id. at 836.
5. See id. at 832-33.
6. See id. at 833.
7. See id.
8. See id. (stating that DiSandro was the third attorney to represent Valli-
noto in the divorce action).
9. See id. (stating that Vallinoto was a citizen of Spain at the time).
10. See id. at 833.
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When Vallinoto's divorce became final in early 1989, DiSan-
dro's sexual and legal relationships with his client had ended."
Vallinoto described DiSandro's legal representation throughout
the divorce action as "excellent."12 She subsequently returned to
DiSandro for additional legal services "long after"13 her divorce
was final and the alleged coerced sexual relations had ceased.14
Vallinoto brought suit against DiSandro in January of 1991,
alleging negligence-based legal malpractice and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 15 A claim of legal malpractice based
upon a breach of fiduciary obligations was not included. 16 A jury
returned a general verdict for Vallinoto which included compensa-
tory and punitive damages.' 7 DiSandro appealed, contending that
the plaintiffs failure to show that she was damaged as a result of
his legal services precluded the jury's finding of legal
malpractice.' 8
BACKGROUND
In Evora v. Henry,19 the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted
the generally accepted rule that a plaintiff in a legal-malpractice
case must prove that the attorney's negligence was the proximate
cause of his or her damages. 20 This position was later reaffirmed
in Scunio Motors, Inc. v. Teverow. 21
In Suppressed v. Suppressed,22 the Appellate Court of Illinois
reviewed a legal-malpractice complaint concerning a divorce attor-
ney's sexual relations with his client.23 The court refused to find
legal malpractice based upon the existence of the relationship, rea-
soning that a legal cause of action should not be created solely be-
ll. See id. at 834.
12. Id. at 836.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 834.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 837.
17, See id. at 834.
18. See id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court publicly censured DiSandro for
his conduct in separate proceedings. See In re DiSandro, 680 A.2d 73 (R.I. 1996).
19. 559 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1989)
20. See id. at 1040.
21. 635 A.2d 268, 269 (R.I. 1993).
22. 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
23. See id. at 102.
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cause one of the parties to a sexual relationship is an attorney.24
The court determined the issue of whether such conduct was an
actionable breach of ethics for the attorney was best left to the
state bar.25 Finally, the court noted that, even if it had determined
that the attorney's conduct was a breach of the fiduciary relation-
ship to his client, the client had failed to allege actual damages in
her complaint. 26
In McDaniel v. Gile,27 the California Court of Appeal reviewed
a complaint alleging that a divorce attorney withheld legal services
from his client when she refused to submit to the attorney's sexual
advances. 28 The complaint alleged actual damages as a result.29
The court declined to adopt a cause of action for legal malpractice
based on sexual relations between the attorney and his or her cli-
ent, but did find that the withholding of legal services was a breach
of the attorney's fiduciary obligation.30
ANALysis AND HOLDING
In Vallinoto, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the
duty that arises from the attorney-client relationship. The court
stated that "in essential part" the duty includes competent legal
representation, including the utilization of legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary to protect and
advance the client's interest.3'
24. See id. at 106.
25. See id. at 105. ABA Formal Opinion 92-364 reviews attorney-client sexual
relationships. The opinion notes four potential risks to the attorney-client relation-
ship. First, the relationship may result from the attorney's exploitation of the cli-
ent's vulnerability and constitute a breach of the fiduciary obligation to the client.
Second, the relationship may deprive the lawyer of independent judgement. Third,
the relationship creates a potential conflict of interest. Finally, the relationship
may risk attorney-client confidences, as the courts will only respect those conver-
sations that occur in the attorney-client setting, and not those that occur as part of
the personal relationship. The committee concluded that the attorney is "well ad-
vised to refrain from such a relationship." See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992).
26. See Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d at 105-06.
27. 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cl. Ct. App. 1991).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 245-46.
30. See id. at 249.
31. Vallinoto, 688 A.2d at 834 (citing R.I. Sup. Ct. Rules of Professional Con-
duct Rule 1.1, art. V).
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In reviewing aspects of Vallinoto and DiSandro's attorney-cli-
ent relationship, the court distinguished McDaniel v. Gile by not-
ing there was no evidence that DiSandro's legal services were
contingent upon the ongoing sexual relations with his client.32 Val-
linoto "clearly had the ability and knowledge"33 to discontinue the
attorney-client relationship at any time if she had become dissatis-
fied with DiSandro's legal representation." Vallinoto herself de-
scribed DiSandro's legal representation as "excellent."35 The court
characterized the results of Vallinoto's divorce as "more than she
had ever anticipated."36 As further evidence that Vallinoto was
satisfied with DiSandro's legal representation, the court noted that
she returned to him for legal services after both the divorce action
and the sexual relationship ended.37 The court concluded that
DiSandro's legal services met the standards required by the profes-
sion.38 The absence of any actual damages mandated a directed
verdict for DiSandro on the claim of negligence-based legal
malpractice.39
The court further refused to create a private cause of action
based on DiSandro's violation of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct,40 noting a that "clear and unanimous judicial rule"41 exists
prohibiting a negligence claim for breach of a fiduciary duty based
solely upon a professional code violation. 42 The Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct themselves specifically state that a "violation...
should not give rise to a cause of action."43 The court followed the
holdings of other jurisdictions44 and its own professional code in
32. See id. at 835.
33. Id. at 835.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 836.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 834.
38. See id. at 836.
39. See id. Vallinoto received an increase in child-support payments, custody
of her daughter, 60% of marital assets, priceless paintings and heirlooms, and at-
torney's fees in the final divorce decree. See id. at 833.
40. See In re DiSandro, 680 A.2d 73 (R.I. 1996). The court found DiSandro had
violated Rule 1.7(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits conflicts
of interest. See id. at 74.
41. Vallinoto, 688 A.2d at 837.
42. See id.
43, Id. at 838 (citing R.I. Sup. Ct. Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble,
art. V).
44. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
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reaching this conclusion. The case was remanded for a new trial
based upon the plaintiffs claim that DiSandro's conduct consti-
tuted intentional infliction of emotional distress.45
CONCLUSION
The court separated DiSandro's legal representation from his
sexual relationship with his client. Analyzing his service as an at-
torney, the court found that DiSandro's legal representation met
the required standards. The plaintiff herself described the service
as excellent, and did not claim that any damages arose from her
attorney's legal representation.
The court determined that the occurrence of sexual relations
between an attorney and his client did not create a cause of action
based solely on the defendant's status as an attorney. Although
critical of DiSandro's action as a professional, the court refused to
create a private cause of action based on his unprofessional con-
duct. The defendant's claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress survived the defendant's appeal, and the case was re-
manded for a new trial.
Mark R. Quigley
45. See id. at 842.
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